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Methods of Funding Central Panels: The Fiscal,
Management, and Policy Implications
Bruce H. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
To date some twenty-four states have established central panel
administrative hearing offices or are well along the path toward
doing so.' The decision of how to fund a central panel is commonly
made when the panel is first established. This decision tends to
reflect the political environments, local organizational needs, and
fiscal realities that prevail at that time. However, these factors can
change over time, sometimes so profoundly that central panel
funding re-emerges as an issue. This recently happened in Minne-
sota. Since its establishment, the Minnesota Office of Administra-
tive Hearings' (OAH) Administrative Law Division has been
funded exclusively from a revolving fund comprised of revenues
from hourly billings for hearing services.'
In 1987, the legislature directed OAH to establish an administra-
tive process for establishing child support obligations.' By 1998,
OAH was performing that function in all of Minnesota's eighty-
seven counties. In the 1999 fiscal year, child support hearings gen-
erated approximately $3.7 million in revenues, or about 75% of all
the Division's revolving fund revenues. In January 1999, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that OAH's administrative child sup-
port hearing process amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of
judicial power to an executive branch agency.4 That spring, legisla-
* Assistant Chief Administrative Law Judge, State of Minnesota, Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearings. B.A., Duke University, 1966; J.D., Duke University, 1973.
1. Attachment A lists the states whose fiscal practices were studied and provides
summary information on how their central panels are funded. The states under study
were selected as a result of participation in annual Central Panel Directors' Confer-
ences. The author recognizes that movement toward a central panel may also be oc-
curring in other states.
2. The Minnesota OAH also has a Workers' Compensation Division that is
funded by an appropriation from the state's Special Compensation Fund.
3. MINN. STAT. § 518.551 (1989).
4. See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725-26 (Minn. 1999) (relying on
the separation of powers doctrine to determine that the administrative process was
unconstitutional).
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tion was enacted transferring that function back to the state court
system. The transfer produced some significant fiscal and manage-
ment problems for the Minnesota OAH and prompted a re-exami-
nation of how the administrative law function is funded.
II. FUNDING METHODS
There are nearly as many different ways of funding administra-
tive hearings, as there are central panels. Generally, funding meth-
ods fall into three main categories: (1) appropriating funds directly
to the hearing office; (2) assessing other agencies for their allocated
shares of the hearing office's costs; and (3) allowing the hearing
office to maintain a revolving fund account and to bill referring
agencies an hourly rate for the time spent on hearings. Many states
use two or more of these methods in combination. Some hearing
offices receive other kinds of revenues, but those income streams
rarely represent funding primary sources. As Attachment "A" in-
dicates, ten state administrative hearing offices are funded entirely
by appropriated funds, five are funded exclusively or mainly by as-
sessments made to other state agencies, and three are funded ex-
clusively by hourly billings that are deposited in a revolving fund.6
The remaining six states (including Minnesota) 7 rely on some hy-
brid of those three main funding methods.
A. Funding by Appropriation
Ten states rely almost exclusively on appropriations to pay for
the cost of operating their administrative hearing offices. Seven of
these states receive all of their appropriations from their state's
general fund revenues.8 Three others receive most of their appro-
priations from restricted state funds. For example, Iowa's general
fund appropriation is relatively small, consisting of only about 15%
of its annual budget; the remaining 85% is appropriated from a
dedicated or special revenue fund. In Michigan, the hearing office
5. This study was originally prepared at the request of the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Finance to assist it in making budget decisions for the fiscal year 2002-2003
biennial budget. Recently, Maryland actually made some significant changes in the
way its OAH is funded because of some serious budget issues that arose there.
6. Iowa, Michigan, and Wyoming.
7. Minnesota is considered a hybrid because its Workers' Compensation Division
is funded with a special workers' compensation fund appropriation.
8. Namely, Alabama, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, South
Dakota, and South Carolina.
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currently has rather limited hearing jurisdiction. About 21% of the
Michigan hearing office's revenue comes from a state general fund
appropriation that is used as a state match for the federal funds
available for certain types of hearings, while about 75% is appro-
priated by the legislature from a restricted special revenue fund.
Finally, 60% of the Wyoming office's budget is funded by a special
fund appropriation from that state's special workers' compensation
fund, with the remaining 40% funded by trunk highway funds.
1. Fiscal Implications
One of the main advantages of funding a central panel with ap-
propriated funds is that it results in a relatively simple and predict-
able budget process that produces a measure of fiscal stability
sometimes lacking with funding by assessment or hourly billing.
There may also be incidental fiscal benefits, such as not having to
tie up funds in a revolving fund balance as a reserve against reve-
nue fluctuations. These may be reasons why more central panels
are funded by direct appropriation than by any other method.
Funding by appropriation can also be financially advantageous
to requesting agencies. For example, agencies do not have to pro-
ject and budget for annual hearing costs. More importantly, there
is no opportunity for the agency to avoid providing hearings as a
way of managing its own budgets. Hearings are often rare and dif-
ficult for small agencies to anticipate and include in their budgets.
Funding by appropriation, therefore, relieves small agencies (that
may only occasionally require hearings) of hearing costs that can
be an unanticipated financial burden. 9 It also helps small agencies
that regularly request hearings avoid the budget turmoil that can
occur when they encounter high-cost, complex contested cases.
Funding a hearing office entirely with appropriated funds can
also reduce the aggregate cost to the taxpayers of administering the
state's justice systems. For example, in Minnesota the direct and
associated costs attributable to a district court judge are currently
about $330,000, with the costs attributable to an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) about one-half of those costs. Local units of gov-
ernment must now pay an hourly rate to use the Minnesota OAH,
while it costs local units of government nothing to use the state
court system, if that is an option. So there is a financial incentive
9. For example, the Minnesota OAH may conduct hearings for as many as eighty
different state and local agencies each year, most of them small agencies.
Fall 2000
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for local units to use the court system, rather than OAH, for even
minor civil or administrative hearings. The overall cost to taxpay-
ers, however, is higher.
There are also some disadvantages to funding by appropriation.
For example, because it bills for hearing services on an hourly ba-
sis, the Minnesota OAH can generate the revenue to hire contract
ALJs when faced with sudden, short-term increases in caseload.
The appropriated funding model provides no revenue stream to
use for this purpose. 10 Funding by appropriation also does not nec-
essarily encourage settlement. Where funds for hearings are di-
rectly appropriated to the hearing office, there are no fiscal
incentives for requesting agencies to avoid hearings. Furthermore,
some view appropriated funding as a state subsidy for costs that
they believe should not be the state's responsibility. For example,
state professional licensing boards' hearing costs are usually built
into licensing fees and passed on to the practitioners being li-
censed. Similarly, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission cur-
rently passes hearing costs on to regulated utilities. Using
appropriated funds to pay for all administrative hearings also can
be viewed as an indirect subsidy to those local units of government
that use the state hearing office to conduct various kinds of due
process hearings. 1
Finally, changing from some other funding method to funding by
appropriation is potentially a complex process. For example, shift-
ing from an hourly billing method to appropriation funding in-
volves the fiscal complexity of backing out hearing costs from the
budgets of larger state agencies, that are heavy users of hearing
services, and directly or indirectly receive appropriated funds for
that purpose.
10. Legislation enacted in the 2000 legislative session now gives OAH the ability
to cross-train some of its thirty-seven workers' compensation judges to conduct ad-
ministrative hearings. This may be helpful for dealing with sudden and short-term
caseload increases. But since the law also requires that the special compensation fund
appropriation be credited for time workers' compensation judges spend on adminis-
trative matters, there still remains the problem of how to pay for the cost of their
services.
11. However, the utilities and professional practitioners, in turn, almost invaria-
bly pass hearing costs on to their ratepayers or clients. So it is members of the public
who ultimately pay in either situation. The issue of local units of government having a
state-funded administrative forum has policy dimensions that are discussed later.
2. Management Implications
Although the process might be fiscally complex, shifting appro-
priations for hearing costs from requesting agencies to a central
hearing office can improve both program and fiscal accountability.
In Minnesota, it is currently difficult to determine whether agen-
cies that request hearings are actually using appropriated funds for
that purpose or whether they are curtailing hearings and using
funds budgeted for hearings to fund other things. Funding by ap-
propriation also relieves potential pressure on a hearing office to
lay off judges or to build redundancy into its hourly rates in re-
sponse to short-term decreases in caseload. But funding by appro-
priation can present a problem when sudden increases in caseload
occur. Existing staff must necessarily handle that increased
caseload, at least until the next budget cycle.12 Moreover, a degree
of personal accountability that accompanies other funding methods
may be absent when funding is by appropriation. For example,
funding by hourly billing requires ALJs to account daily for their
time in order to produce hourly billings to agencies. Some degree
of billing accountability is also necessary with the assessment
method in order to produce accurate agency assessments.' 3 On the
other hand, appropriated funding tends to give the governor and
the legislature a much greater degree of oversight and control over
the hearing office's activities than the assessment and billing meth-
ods. For example, operating a central panel as a revolving fund
activity essentially means operating it as an enterprise, creating a
natural pressure on the office to seek out and find new sources of
hearings. Whether part of a state's legal system should be operated
as an enterprise is a legitimate policy question.
3. Policy Implications
Funding a central panel office with appropriated funds advances
important public policy objectives. For example, both the billing
and the assessment methods of funding mean that the public
agency or body, which is one of the parties to a contested case,
pays for the ALJ. These methods of funding often give rise to pub-
12. With its new statutory ability to cross-train workers' compensation judges,
the Minnesota OAH is not likely to have any problem in finding judges to handle a
sudden increase in caseload. But as previously noted, there would remain the prob-
lem of how to pay for those additional judicial services until the next budget cycle.
13. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the disadvantages of the assessment
method).
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lic perceptions that the hearing office may be under pressure to
produce a result that is favorable to the agency that is paying the
bill. Such perceptions can create a serious threat to judicial inde-
pendence. The billing and assessment methods of funding also can
erode public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative
process, a forum where many members of the public have their
only encounter with a state's legal system.
In many states, both private parties and government agencies
rely on the availability of a state-funded forum for resolution of
disputes. For example, counties were originally responsible for
funding Minnesota's state court system, but over time the state
gradually assumed nearly all the financial burden. Many local units
of government, particularly small ones with small tax bases, have
the same expectation of a state-funded forum for administrative
disputes, such as annexation hearings, personnel hearings, etc., as
well as for minor disputes that are now directed into the court
system.
A related policy consideration is budgetary in nature. Funding
the administrative process by appropriation potentially offers the
state court system relief from increasing workloads and financial
pressures from within by diverting minor cases that can be handled
quickly and less expensively in an administrative process. The
other two available methods of funding cannot reasonably achieve
these objectives. 14 Furthermore, billing agencies for the cost of ad-
ministrative hearings results in pressure on the central panel office
to keep those costs to a minimum. This sometimes results in undue
pressure on ALJs to only superficially address complex matters in
order to minimize the cost to the referring agency. Finally, agen-
cies may hesitate to promulgate a rule or set a matter for hearing
because it appears too costly or because the agency's budget for
those functions is exhausted. Appropriated funding can relieve
these pressures.
B. Funding by Assessment
Five state administrative hearing offices' 5 rely entirely or prima-
rily on what can be characterized as assessment methods of fund-
ing. Two other states rely partially on assessment methods. 6 The
14. These advantages may not be available in states where the administrative law
function is funded by appropriations from special or dedicated funds.
15. Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Oregon, and Texas.
16. Louisiana and New Jersey.
particular features of these assessment systems vary widely from
state to state, depending mainly on the structure of each state's
budget process. However, all assessment systems involve some
kind of periodic pro rata allocation of the hearing office's costs to
the agencies that use its services.
For example, Maryland recently shifted from a billing system to
an assessment system. The features of Maryland's system are typi-
cal. The Maryland hearing office submits a biennial budget propo-
sal to that state's executive finance agency. That agency approves
the budget and then allocates the cost of the hearing office's opera-
tions to the state agencies expected to request hearings during the
biennium. The allocations are based on each agency's historical
use of hearing services. The amounts allocated then appear as line
items in each requesting agency's budget, and the legislature ap-
propriates the funds for hearings to those agencies. The Maryland
hearing office then obtains access to those funds by billing the
other state agencies an hourly rate for services. That hourly rate,
however, is merely a device for obtaining payment, because it is
established by dividing the hearing office's authorized budget by
the aggregate estimate of hours of service that it expects to provide
during the biennium.
17
1. Fiscal Implications
As with funding by appropriation, there are fiscal advantages
and disadvantages to the assessment method of funding adminis-
trative hearing services. Although periodic assessments do not cre-
ate as much fiscal stability as funding by appropriation, they at
least eliminate the worry that annual revenues from billing will be
insufficient to cover annual costs. Therefore, the budget of a hear-
ing office funded by assessment is more predictable and stable than
the budget of a hearing office funded entirely by hourly billings.
Another problem posed by the billing method is that many cases
referred to the central panel settle before there is any ALJ involve-
ment. States like Minnesota, which only bill for ALJ time, are una-
ble to recapture any costs associated with the time the staff spends
on docketing and other support functions for those cases.' 8 The
17. In other assessment states, agencies make a single annual lump sum transfer
of their assessment to the administrative hearing office, thereby decreasing the cost of
the billing process. Texas' assessment system is an example of that.
18. In effect, those costs are passed on and spread among the agencies that are
billed for ALJ time. Some offices have started to address the problem with other
charges, such as filing fees. See infra, Part II.D.
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required cost accounting system for assessment funding method is
easily adapted to recover those costs. Also, as with funding by ap-
propriation, the assessment method of funding does not require
funds to be tied up in a revolving fund balance as a reserve against
revenue fluctuations. Finally, an assessment system can be de-
signed to accommodate hiring contract ALJs, thereby providing a
hearing office greater ability to manage a sudden caseload in-
crease. For example, Texas allows its hearing office to charge agen-
cies what amounts to an "outlier" if hearing volume exceeds
estimates by ten percent or more.
As is the case with the other funding methods, there are also
some fiscal disadvantages to an assessment system. Because agen-
cies can be expected to have an interest in reducing their annual
assessments, there is a fiscal incentive for them to avoid providing
citizens with due process hearings. 19 Another problem with fund-
ing by assessment is the difficulty in establishing assessments for
smaller state agencies and licensing boards that are only occasion-
ally confronted with contested case proceedings. But by far the
greatest problem with funding by assessment is that it does not
work with hearing services provided to local units of government,
that is, governmental entities not included within the state budget
system. Finally, the assessment method of funding requires a fairly
elaborate internal cost accounting system.
2. Management Implications
Accounts with agencies can be settled on an annual basis, there-
fore, the assessment method of funding can provide more flexibil-
ity in managing caseload fluctuations than appropriated funding
allows. On the other hand, the assessment method does share one
quality assurance benefit with the billing method.20 The cost-ac-
counting system that is required for an assessment funding system
still requires judges, to some degree, to account for the time that
they spend on individual cases. On a larger scale, an assessment
funding system generally requires greater involvement with the
state's Executive Budget Agency and greater control over budget
development than a billing system. Finally, an assessment method
is not vulnerable to criticism for operating part of the legal system
as an enterprise.
19. Making hearing costs a line item in agency budgets tends to partially mitigate
this concern.
20. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the disadvantages of an assessment system).
3. Policy Implications
In the assessment method of funding, there are usually one or
more intermediaries in the financial dealings between an adminis-
trative hearing office and the state agencies for which it conducts
hearings. Depending on the model, those intermediaries can in-
clude the state Executive Budget Agency, the Governor's office,
and even the Legislature. Where there are such intermediaries,
there is less danger of state agencies using financial pressure to in-
fluence the outcomes of administrative hearings. So the assess-
ment method guarantees more neutrality and impartiality in the
administrative process than the billing method. Greater fiscal dis-
tance between the administrative hearing office and its referring
agencies also tends to diminish public perceptions of lack of neu-
trality and impartiality.2'
On the other hand, because local units of government are not
part of the state budget process, the only workable way to include
local agencies in an assessment model would be a model similar to
that used in Texas, where the administrative hearing office negoti-
ates with some agencies for annual lump sum payments.22 But in
order to serve local units of government with only occasional hear-
ing needs, an assessment method would have to be combined with
limited hourly billing to those agencies.
Furthermore, an assessment method does not effectively deal
with any desires or expectations of political subdivisions to have a
state-funded forum for administrative disputes that is commensu-
rate with the state-funded forum for court disputes. Political subdi-
visions are still responsible for the cost of the administrative forum,
as well as their own legal costs. Therefore, applying the assessment
method to hearings requested by local units of government does
little to divert minor matters away from overloaded state court sys-
tems to the quicker and less expensive administrative process. On
the other hand, because the assessment method looks at an
21. For example, in the Colorado and Maryland assessment models, where hear-
ing costs appear as line items in agency budgets, the legislature ultimately decides on
the levels of hearing services that state agencies offer and provide. So there is a very
strong check and balance against state agencies using fiscal pressure on the adminis-
trative hearings office as a way of trying to influence outcomes. On the other hand, in
the Texas model where the administrative hearing office simply negotiates with other
state agencies for annual lump sum payments, the potential for undue influence
remains.
22. Referring to larger counties and municipalities with a relatively large and
steady hearing volume.
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agency's aggregate annual hearing costs rather than the cost of in-
dividual hearings, there is less pressure on ALJs to address com-
plex cases superficially out of concern for what an individual case
may be costing the referring agency.23 Finally, the cost accounting
systems that are necessary for an assessment system preserve the
quality assurance check inherent in requiring ALJs to account for
their time on a regular basis.
C. Funding by Hourly Billing
There are only three state administrative hearing offices that rely
entirely on an hourly billing method of funding.24 However, three
other states, relying primarily on assessment funding systems, also
allow a minor amount of hourly billing.25 Five other states have
hybrid funding systems that rely partly on hourly billing.26
Tennessee and New Jersey are unique among states that employ
hybrid funding methods. In Tennessee, the legislature effectively
subsidizes the hourly billing rate that the hearing office charges by
giving it an annual general fund appropriation to cover 60% of its
hearing costs. Similarly, the New Jersey administrative hearing of-
fice receives a general fund appropriation that covers part of the
cost of hearing services for agencies that are unable to pass hearing
costs on to third parties.27
The three other states that have hybrid funding systems all use
different criteria for determining which agencies are billed at an
hourly rate and which are not. Minnesota funds all of its adminis-
trative hearings, other than workers' compensation, by billing its
costs at an hourly rate and may be considered an hourly billing
state. Arizona bills an hourly rate to licensing boards that recover
hearing costs through licensing fees. And Wisconsin only uses a
revolving fund for billing the cost of special education appeals to
school districts.
23. Large complex cases would still remain a problem for small agencies with
only occasional hearing experience.
24. California, North Dakota, and Washington.
25. Florida bills political subdivisions an hourly rate for hearings conducted for
them. Texas bills an hourly rate to agencies that do not pay for hearing costs with
general fund appropriations. Oregon bills an hourly rate to agencies that did not
make a contribution to the office's establishment.
26. Arizona, Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
27. New Jersey bills a full hourly rate to agencies that are able to pass hearing
costs on.
The hourly rates that administrative hearing offices charge to
other agencies also widely vary. On the low end with its 60% legis-
lative subsidy, Tennessee only bills agencies $40.00 per hour. On
the high end, New Jersey charges agencies $249.00 per hour. 8 The
billing rates of California,29 Wisconsin,30 Florida,31 Minnesota,32
and North Dakota33 fall in between these two extremes. Oregon
charges $63.00 per hour for the services of ALJs, but it also bills
agencies for the time the office support staff spends on cases at the
rate of $40.00 per hour. However, whether the administrative
hearing office relies entirely, partially, or minimally on hourly bill-
ing, the method has both positive and negative fiscal implications.
1. Fiscal Implications
Billing agencies at an hourly rate for time that ALJs spend on
administrative proceedings has some fiscal advantages. One major
advantage is that the state does not pay for the cost of providing
hearing services for local units of government or for state agencies
that are able to pass the costs on to users of their services. Also,
billing for time spent works particularly well for hearing offices
that conduct large numbers of high volume, low cost hearings, such
as drivers' license suspension and revocation hearings, and human
services entitlement hearings, where changes in volume tend to oc-
cur slowly and predictably. Moreover, when sudden and unantici-
pated increases in caseload do occur, the hearing agency has
assurance of sufficient funds to hire additional staff to do the work.
Finally, requiring agencies to pay the full cost of administrative
hearings from their own operating budgets creates an incentive to
settle disputes that might otherwise result in hearings.
There are also a number of financial disadvantages to the billing
method of funding. The most significant of these is potential finan-
cial instability. When annual hearing volume is in a state of flux
and unpredictable, the hearing office's revenues will fluctuate,
causing difficult and unpredictable budgeting. Furthermore, when
there is a sudden reduction in hearing volume,34 the hearing office
may be forced to suddenly and substantially increase billing rates
28. As noted above, some agencies receive a subsidy toward this rate.
29. $137.00.
30. $135.00.
31. $100.00.
32. $91.00.
33. $79.52.
34. Minnesota recently experienced such a sudden reduction in hearing volume.
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to cover lay-off costs and general office overhead expenses that
remain relatively constant. This, in turn, can create budget difficul-
ties for the agencies that request hearings. Also, using the hourly
billing method and a revolving fund requires tying up money to
maintain a fund balance as a reserve against revenue fluctuations.
Moreover, many administrative cases referred to hearing offices
settle before an ALJ actually invests any time in them. Therefore,
unless the hearing office bills agencies for the support staff's time
spent on docketing and other pre-hearing functions,35 those costs
end up being factored into ALJ rates and are effectively shifted to
other user agencies. Finally, the billing method of funding requires
ALJs to spend additional time accounting for their time every day
(commonly in six-minute increments). This cost must also be built
into the ALJs hourly billing rate.
From the standpoint of client agencies, hourly billing generally
does not work well for small agencies or units of government
whose need for contested case hearings is only occasional and spo-
radic. One or two complex contested cases can wreak havoc with a
small agency's annual budget. In the case of large agencies, there
can be pressure on the agency to avoid giving people hearings as a
way of balancing budgets or funding other agency activities that are
considered more important unless funds appropriated by the legis-
lature for hearings are restricted (which is rarely the case).
2. Management Implications
The billing method of funding, combined with the use of contract
ALJs to handle caseload overflow, provides the greatest amount of
flexibility in managing a hearing office's docket. Requiring ALJs
to account on an hourly or a sub-hourly basis for the way they
spend their time fosters a sense of personal accountability. The
downside of that practice is that ALJs and agencies often become
too concerned about time spent on individual cases, adding pres-
sure on ALJs to treat complex issues superficially solely out of con-
cern for costs. 36 The billing method of funding essentially treats a
state's administrative justice system as an enterprise, with the
state's executive budget agency and legislature exercising only lim-
35. It appears that only Oregon bills separately for support staff time.
36. Costs can also be a problem with appropriated or assessment funding, but the
main concern in those contexts is likely to be aggregate costs and not the cost a partic-
ular case.
ited oversight over the budget process and related policy issues.37
In that environment it is easy for executive branch leadership to
take the hearing office for granted, making it difficult to get the
leadership to address policy issues that periodically arise with re-
spect to the hearing office's work.
3. Policy Implications
The billing method of funding presents the greatest opportunity
for agencies to exert subtle, if not overt, financial pressure on the
hearing office in order to influence the outcomes of particular
cases.38 Because the relationship between hearing provider and re-
questing agency is essentially contractual, there is always the risk
that the requesting agency will try to bring the hearing function in-
house or seek to contract elsewhere. Even where no such pressure
exists, the perception of partiality and lack of neutrality is strongest
where the requesting agency is billed directly for the cost of a par-
ticular party's hearing. On the other hand, the billing method of
funding makes it possible for local units of government to use a
central panel administrative hearing office to hear disputes of a lo-
cal nature at no cost to the state.
However, there are associated disadvantages. Rather than pay
for the cost of a neutral administrative forum, many local units of
government tend to refer local disputes to their own employees or
governing bodies, a practice that gives the appearance of partiality
and lack of neutrality to members of the public. The lack of a
state-funded administrative forum also discourages local units of
government from diverting minor matters away from overloaded
state court systems. Because the cost of providing a court trial is
about twice the amount of providing an administrative hearing, the
aggregate cost to taxpayers of handling minor civil and administra-
tive matters is unnecessarily higher.
37. However, in Minnesota, there is central control of state salaries, as well as
more general controls on real estate leases and purchasing. These are all indirect
methods of oversight.
38. This problem can also occur with the assessment method, but by focusing on
cost in the aggregate, there is less danger of exerting pressure to influence the out-
come of a particular case. Also, bringing a neutral agency, such as the executive
budget agency, into the assessment process tends to neutralize any such pressure.
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D. Other Revenue Sources
Some administrative hearing offices have started to charge client
agencies filing fees or other types of fees and charges. For exam-
ple, California started charging referring agencies a $75.00 filing
fee. The purpose of this charge is to ensure that the hearing office
is compensated for staff time spent on cases that quickly settle or,
for other reasons, require very little ALJ involvement. Tennessee
has taken a different approach to the same problem, by charging
all referring agencies a minimum of two ALJ hours.39 If an ALJ
spends more time than two hours on the case, the hearing office
simply bills for the actual time spent. However, if less than two
hours is spent on the case, the referring agency is still billed the
minimum charge. Maryland started charging appellants a $15.00
filing fee as a way of discouraging frivolous appeals. In special ed-
ucation cases, Wisconsin has authority to charge school districts a
$300.00 late cancellation fee to encourage early efforts at
settlement.
New Jersey has what is perhaps the most unique source of other
revenue. West Publishing Company has a contract under which it
pays the state for the right to publish and sell the New Jersey Ad-
ministrative Code and the New Jersey Register. The contract pay-
ment that the state receives from West is used to fund the New
Jersey hearing office's Rules and Publications Unit. The New
Jersey hearing office also receives royalties from West resulting
from the sale of the New Jersey Register and the New Jersey Admin-
istrative Code.
III. CONCLUSION
There are different fiscal, management, and policy implications
associated with each of the three major methods by which central
panels are funded. No method of funding appears to be intrinsi-
cally superior to the others in all situations. The funding method or
combination that will work best for a particular state is usually con-
text dependent. So, when issues of funding arise, it is important to
recognize some of the unintended consequences of funding
choices. That, in turn, requires recognition of the fiscal, manage-
ment, and policy consequences likely to flow from possible funding
choices when viewed in light of the local situational context. Local
39. Two AU hours in Tennessee totals $80.00.
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factors, such as case mix, levels of activity for various agencies, po-
litical issues, and history of relationships between agencies, will
often dictate the best funding choice for a particular central panel.
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